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This paper presents an analysis of the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth 
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dynamic general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries make portfolio 
decisions on behalf of agents, and bureaucrats collect tax revenues on behalf of the 
government. Corruption takes the form of the embezzlement of public funds, the effect of 
which is to increase the government’s reliance on seigniorage finance. This leads to an 
increase in inflation which, in turn, reduces capital accumulation and growth. At the empirical 
level, we use data on 82 countries over a 20-year period to test the predictions of our model. 
Taking proper account of the government’s budget constraint, we find strong evidence to 
support these predictions under different estimation strategies. Our results are robust to a wide 
range of sensitivity tests. 
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The relationship between public sector corruption and economic growth has
been the subject of intense research, particularly over the past 15 years.1
This research has led to the broad consensus that corruption is a major
obstacle to growth and prosperity, and poses a serious (if not the primary)
threat to economic and social development. The ways in which corruption
can manifest and impact on the economy are many and varied, and it is
important to understand the range and diversity of the mechanisms involved.
In this paper we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of a mechanism
that relates to public ￿nance considerations.
The general negative relationship between corruption and growth has
been identi￿ed in numerous empirical studies using various techniques and
various data sets (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong 2003; Keefer and Knack 1997;
Knack and Keefer 1995; Li et al. 2000; Mauro 1995; and Sachs and Warner
1997).2 These and other investigations (including theoretical work) also pro-
vide insight into the many channels through which corruption might take
e⁄ect. A non-exhaustive list of these is the following: corruption may cause
a misallocation of talent and skills away from productive (entrepreneurial)
activities towards non-productive (rent-seeking) activities (e.g., Acemoglu
1995; Ehrlich and Lui 1999; Murphy et al. 1991); corruption may under-
mine the protection of property rights, create obstacles to doing business
and impede innovation and technological transfer (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999;
North 1990; World Bank 2002); corruption may cause ￿rms to expand less
rapidly, to adopt ine¢ cient technologies and to shift their operations to the
informal sector (e.g., Svensson 2005; Sarte 2000); corruption may limit the
extent of a country￿ s trade openness and reduce in￿ ows of foreign investment
(e.g., Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Wei 2000); corruption may lead to costly
concealment and detection of illegal income, resulting in a deadweight loss of
resources (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007);
corruption may compromise human development through a deterioriation in
the scale and quality of public health and education programmes (e.g., Azfar
2001; Blackburn and Sarmah 2008; Gupta et al. 2000; Reinikka and Svensson
2005); and corruption may cause a general misallocation of public expendi-
1The most popular de￿nition of public sector corruption is the abuse of public o¢ ce
for personal gain. For some excellent surveys of the corruption literature, see Aidt (2003),
Bardhan (1997) and Jain (2001).
2By contrast, there is very little evidence to support the so-called ￿speed money￿
hypothesis, according to which corruption can be bene￿cial to growth by helping to cir-
cumvent cumbersome regulations (red tape) in the bureaucratic process (e.g., Huntington
1968; Le⁄ 1964; Lui 1985).
2tures as certain areas of spending (e.g., military spending) are targeted more
for their capacity to generate bribes than their potential to improve living
standards (e.g., Gupta et al. 2001; Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).3
In terms of public ￿nances, corruption may impact independently on both
the expenditure and revenue sides of the government￿ s budget: for any given
state of the latter, corruption can distort the composition of expenditures
in ways described above; for any given state of the former, corruption can
alter the manner by which revenues must be generated, as suggested by other
empirical evidence. Thus Ghura (1998), Imam and Jacobs (2007) and Tanzi
and Davoodi (1997, 2000) conclude that corruption reduces total tax revenues
by reducing the revenues from almost all taxable sources (including incomes,
pro￿ts, property, capital gains and goods and services). The implication is
that, ceteris paribus, other means of raising income must be sought, and
one of the most tempting of these is seigniorage. Signi￿cantly, it has been
found that in￿ ation (a likely consequence of seigniorage) is positively related
to the incidence of corruption (e.g., Al-Marhubi 2000), whilst seigniorage,
itself, has a negative e⁄ect on growth (e.g., Adam and Bevan 2005; Bose
et al. 2007). It is these observations that provide the motivation for this
paper which seeks to analyse in detail (both theoretically and empirically)
the in￿ uence of corruption on the composition of government revenues and
the implications of this for growth and development.4
Our theoretical analysis is based on a stochastic dynamic general equi-
librium model in which growth occurs endogenously through capital accu-
mulation that is governed by the portfolio allocation decisions of ￿nancial
intermediaries on behalf of agents. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
and Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999, 2000), we consider a scenario in which
individuals are subject to random relocation shocks that create a trade-o⁄
between investing in a productive, but illiquid, asset (capital) and a non-
productive, but liquid, asset (money). Intermediaries, which receive deposits
from individuals, optimise this trade-o⁄ by choosing a composition of port-
folio that depends on the relative rates of return of the two assets. An
increase in in￿ ation, which reduces the return on money, causes a portfolio
3In addition to all this, there is good reason for believing that the relationship between
corruption and growth is two-way causal (i.e., that corruption not only in￿ uences, but is
also in￿ uenced by, the level of economic prosperity). The support for this is both empirical
(e.g., Montinola and Jackman 1999; Paldam 2002; Treisman 2000) and theoretical (e.g.,
Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007; Blackburn and Sarmah 2008).
4Since the government budget constraint implies a link between monetary and ￿scal
policies, corruption of the latter may have serious consequences for the conduct of the
former. See Huang and Wei (2006) for a recent analysis of the role of corruption in
monetary policy.
3re-allocation away from capital investment (loans to ￿rms) towards greater
cash holdings in order to guarantee adequate provision of liquidity services for
those agents who are forced to relocate. Against this background, we study
the e⁄ects of corruption on growth and development. We model corruption
as the embezzlement of public funds by bureaucrats who are appointed by
the government to collect tax revenues from ￿rms for the purpose of ￿nancing
productive public expenditures. This looting of public resources means that,
for any given levels of taxes and expenditures (together with the absence of
borrowing), the government must rely more on the revenue from printing
money (i.e., seigniorage) in order to satisfy its budget constraint. The e⁄ect
of this is to increase in￿ ation with the consequences described above. Since
capital investment is lower, so too is the accumulation of capital and so too
is the rate of growth.
Our empirical analysis aims to test the main predictions of our model.
We use a panel of 82 countries covering all stages of development over the
period 1980-1999. Based on a consistent treatment of the revenue side of the
government budget constraint, we obtain results that o⁄er strong support for
the above conclusions. These results are robust to a wide range of senstitivity
tests, including the use of alternative regression speci￿cations, estimation
techniques, instrumentation strategies, sample coverages and measurement
approaches.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical analysis, setting out and solving our model economy to establish
the key implications. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, describing
our methodology and data, presenting our basic ￿ndings and reporting on
the results of extensive robustness tests. Section 4 contains a few concluding
remarks.
2 Theory
Our theoretical model describes an overlapping generations economy in which
there is an in￿nite sequence of two-period-lived agents who make up a con-
stant population of unit mass. Each generation of agents is divided at birth
into a fraction, ￿ 2 (0;1), of private citizens (or households) and a remain-
ing fraction, 1 ￿ ￿, of public o¢ cials (or bureaucrats).5 Households work
5We assume that agents are di⁄erentiated at birth according to their abilities and
skills. Households are individuals who lack the skills necessary to become bureaucrats.
Bureaucrats are individuals who possess these skills and who are induced to take up public
o¢ ce by an allocation of talent condition established below. Thus, as in other analyses
(e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007; Sarte 2000), we abstract
4for ￿rms in the production of output, whilst bureaucrats work for the gov-
ernment in the administration of public policy. All agents work only when
young and consume only when old. Consumption is ￿nanced from savings
with ￿nancial intermediaries that make optimal portfolio choices on behalf
of agents by allocating their deposits between liquid and illiquid assets. This
role of intermediaries is created by the existence of idiosyncratic relocation
shocks which also motivate a demand for liquidity. The government makes
expenditures on public goods and services using whatever public funds and
other means of ￿nance are available. Corruption may occur because of the
opportunity for bureaucrats to further their own interests by appropriating
public funds for themselves. For reasons given below, we assume that at least
some fraction, ￿ 2 (0;1), of bureaucrats will never exploit such an opportu-
nity, whilst the remaining fraction, 1￿￿, may do so.6 Firms, of which there
is a unit mass, conduct all of their business in perfectly competitive product
and factor markets. In more detail the economy is descibed as follows.
2.1 Government
We envisage the government as providing public goods and services which
contribute to the e¢ ciency of output production. The real value of expen-
diture on these items, gt, is assumed to be a ￿xed proportion, ￿ 2 (0;1), of
output, yt. The government also incurs expenditures on bureaucrats￿salaries
which are determined as follows. Any bureaucrat (whether corruptible or
non-corruptible) can work for a ￿rm to earn an income equal to the wage
paid to households. Any bureaucrat who is willing to accept a salary less
than this wage must be expecting to receive compensation through some form
of malpractice and is therefore immediately identi￿ed as being corrupt. As
in other analyses (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier 1998; Blackburn et al. 2006;
from issues relating to occupational choice. In doing so, we are able to simplify matters
by not having to consider possible changes in the size of the bureaucracy and possible
changes in the level of corruption that may result from this. Of course, we do not mean to
undermine the importance of corruption in determining occupational choice. As indicated
by others, an economy may well su⁄er as a consequence of this, with a misallocation of
talent between productive (entrepreneurial) activities and non-productive (rent-seeking)
activities (e.g., Acemoglu 1995; Murphy et al. 1991).
6This distinction between corruptible and non-corruptible bureaucrats may re￿ ect dif-
ferences in pro￿ciencies at being corrupt or di⁄erences in moral attitudes towards being
corrupt (e.g., Acemoglou and Verdier 2000; Besley and McLaren 1993; Blackburn et al.
2006; Tirole 1996). The main purpose of this assumption is to allow us to determine the
wages of bureaucrats in a relatively straightforward way that does not demand additional
assumptions about how public sector pay is determined. In fact, all we need for this pur-
pose is that there be at least one bureaucrat who is non-corruptible - all other bureaucrats
may well be potential transgressors.
5Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007), we assume that a bureaucrat who is
discovered to be corrupt is subject to the maximum ￿ne of having all of his
income con￿scated (i.e., he is dismissed without pay). Consequently, no cor-
ruptible bureaucrat would ever reveal himself in the way described above. As
such, the government can minimise its labour costs, whilst ensuring complete
bureaucratic participation, by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats equal to
the wage paid by ￿rms to households.7 Denoting the real value of this wage
by wt, it follows that the total real wage bill for the government is (1￿￿)wt.
To ￿nance its expenditures, the government levies a tax on ￿rms￿output
at the ￿xed proportional rate ￿ 2 (0;1) and prints money to the tune of
Mt ￿ Mt￿1, where Mt denotes nominal cash balances. Responsibility for the
collection of tax revenues lies with bureaucrats, each of whom has jurisdiction
over the same number, 1
1￿￿, of ￿rms. The total amount of tax revenue col-
lected individually is therefore
￿yt
1￿￿. Each non-corrupt bureaucrat, of whom
there are ￿(1￿￿), returns all of this revenue to the government, whilst each
corrupt bureaucrat, of whom there are (1￿￿)(1￿￿), appropriates all of it for
himself. Thus the actual amount of tax revenue available to the government
is ￿￿yt.
Given the above, we may derive an expression for the government￿ s budget
constraint. Letting Pt denote the price level, we write this in real terms as
Mt ￿ Mt￿1
Pt
+ ￿￿yt = gt + (1 ￿ ￿)wt; (1)
where
Mt￿Mt￿1
Pt is understood to be the government￿ s total real revenue from
printing money, or seigniorage.
2.2 Agents
All agents have the same preferences. For those born at time t, lifetime







(￿ > 0) where ct+1 denotes (old-age) consumption. Each and every agent
is also endowed with the same unit amount of labour when young which is
supplied inelastically to a given occupation (private employment or public
service) in return for the same labour income of wt. For a household and
a non-corrupt bureaucrat, this is the only source of earnings. For a corrupt
7This has the usual interpretation of an allocation of talent condition. The government
cannot force any of the potential bureaucrats to actually take up public o¢ ce, but it
induces all of them to do so by paying what they would earn elsewhere.
6bureaucrat, there is also the tax revenue,
￿yt
1￿￿, that he embezzles. We as-
sume that such an individual enjoys immunity from any risk of detection or
punishment. This assumption (used in other analyses) is intended primarily
as a simpli￿cation, though it is probably near the mark for many developing
countries, where the will and wherewithal to combat corruption are relatively
weak, and where perpertrators of corrupt practices can ply their trade with a
good deal of con￿dence of impunity.8 To provide further motivation, we note
that, in general, there are a number of ways in which corrupt individuals may
conceal their behaviour, such as hiding their illegal income, investing this in-
come di⁄erently from legal income and altering their patterns of expenditure.
For the purposes of the present analysis, we suppose that the objective can
be achieved if all ill-gotten gains are consumed immediately or disposed of
in some other secure and unproductive way, rather than being saved in the
same manner as labour income (i.e., deposited with ￿nancial intermediaries);
otherwise, an o⁄ender is exposed with certainty.
As in Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999, 2000), we consider the following
scenario for introducing uncertainty among the population. Each agent of
each generation is allocated at birth to one of two symmetric locations where
he remains for the ￿rst period of his life. Subsequently, at the beginning
of his second period of life, the agent is randomly reassigned locations. We
denote by q 2 (0;1) the probability that an agent is relocated, 1￿q being the
probability that he stays where he is. Individuals￿uncertainty about their
future whereabouts is important for determining the composition of savings.
The only means of saving that exist are a liquid, but unproductive, asset -
money - and an illiquid, but productive, asset - capital. Of these, only the
former can be transferred between locations because of its liquidity. As such,
agents may desire to save in the form of cash (even when it is dominated
in rate of return), since this is the only means of smoothing consumption in
the face of relocation shocks. Under such circumstances, there is a positive
demand for money. We study this in detail in our subsequent analysis.
8Even when governments strive to be vigilant, corruption may thrive for a number of
reasons, such as the prohibitive costs of ￿ghting it when resources are scarce, the inherent
di¢ culties in detecting it when monitoring is imprecise and the innate problems in exposing
it when monitoring is abused. The last of these possibilities (where those appointed as
vigilance o¢ cers are themselves open to bribes) bears on the interesting and complex
issue of corruption in hierarchies (e.g., Basu et al. 1992; Marjit and Shi 1998; Mishra
2002). From a normative perspective, it has been shown by Bose (2004) how imperfect
vigilance, combined with direct penalties for bribe-taking, may lead to outcomes that are
Pareto-inferior to those that would occur if no sanctions were applied at all.
72.3 Firms
The representative ￿rm combines lt units of labour with kt units of capital








(A > 0; ￿;￿ 2 (0;1)). The ￿rm hires labour at the competitively-determined
real wage wt and rents capital at the competitively-determined real interest
rate rt. Given that output is taxed at the rate ￿, pro￿t maximisation implies











t . Observe that
equilibrium in the labour market requires lt = ￿, and recall from our earlier






rt = r = (1 ￿ ￿)￿a; (5)
where a = (A￿￿￿
1￿￿)
1
￿. Thus equilibrium wages are proportional to the
capital stock, whilst the equilibrium interest rate is constant.
2.4 Financial Intermediaries
As in the analysis of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we view ￿nancial inter-
mediaries as cooperative institutions consisting of coalitions formed by the
young members of the population. The liquidity preference shocks which fea-
ture in that analysis have their counterpart in the relocations shocks which
￿gure in our own investigation. We assume that these shocks are identically
and independently distributed across agents who prefer to save through in-
termediaries, rather than by themselves, because doing so allows them to
exploit the law of large numbers in eliminating individual risk.
Each period, intermediaries receive deposits from young agents and make
portfolio allocation decisions in the interest of their depositors. The portfolio
consists of money and capital, each of which has bene￿ts and costs: money
provides liquidity insurance for agents who are relocated, but does not pay
any rate of interest; capital provides a rate of return for agents who are
not relocated, but is unavailable to those who move. Intermediaries seek to
optimise this trade-o⁄ by choosing a portfolio allocation and a con￿guration
of deposit returns that maximise the expected welfare of their clients, subject
to a set of resource constraints. Let ￿t 2 (0;1) denote the fraction of deposits
invested in capital (i.e., lent to ￿rms) so that 1￿￿t is the remaining fraction
8which is held as money. Also, let it and It denote, respectively, the gross
real rates of return paid to depositors who move and do not move location.
Finally, de￿ne ￿t = Pt
Pt+1, the gross rate of de￿ ation, or the real return on
money. Then the decision problem for an intermediary is to choose values of









qit = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t; (7)
(1 ￿ q)It = ￿tr: (8)
The expression in (6) is the expected utility of an agent who deposits the
full amount of his labour income, wt, and who faces a probability, q, of being
relocated (in which case he receives a return of it) and a probability, 1￿q, of
staying where he is (in which case he receives a return of It). The expression
in (7) is the constraint which ensures that an intermediary is able to make
a total real repayment of qwtit to those depositors who move location, using
its total real holdings of money, (1 ￿ ￿t)wt￿t. The expression in (8) is the
constraint which ensures that an intermediary is able to make a total real
repayment of (1 ￿ q)wtIt to those depositors who stay where they are, using
the total proceeds from its capital investment, ￿twtr.




















Evidently, ￿0(￿) > 0: an increase in the return on money induces intermedi-
aries to allocate a larger fraction of deposits towards capital. This is because
lower in￿ ation makes it easier for intermediaries to provide adequate liquid-
ity for those agents who are relocated. Since less money needs to be held, a
greater proportion of deposits can be allocated towards productive capital.9
2.5 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
Our model economy displays a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which
all real variables grow at the same constant rate. This growth rate, denoted
9This is the income e⁄ect of a change in in￿ ation. There is also a substitution e⁄ect,
whereby the increase in return on money relative to capital (as a result of lower in￿ ation)
induces a portfolio reallocation from the latter to the former. Under our assumption that
￿ > 0, the income e⁄ect dominates the substitution e⁄ect.
9by ￿, is determined from the capital market equilibrium condition which
states that the total demand for capital by ￿rms must equal the total supply
of capital by ￿nancial intermediaries. The former is given by kt+1, whilst the
latter is given by ￿twt (which is the total amount of deposits from households
and bureaucrats that intermediaries allocate towards capital investment).






kt (the growth rate of capital) is constant if ￿t (the
portfolio share of capital) is constant which, from (9), requires that ￿t (the





Since ￿0(￿) > 0, an increase in in￿ ation (i.e., a decrease in ￿) produces
a fall in growth because of the reduction in productive investment.10 The
basic objective of our analysis is to show how this may arise as a result of
corruption.
Let mt ￿ Mt
Pt , denote the total real value of money balances. Since inter-
mediaries hold a fraction, 1 ￿ ￿t, of their total real deposits, wt, as cash, we




[1 ￿ ￿(￿)]kt: (11)
For reasons discussed already, an increase in in￿ ation leads to an increase
in real money holdings as intermediaries strive to provide adequate liquidity




Given the above, we may proceed to determine the rate of in￿ ation. This
is dictated by the ￿nancing needs of the government in accordance with its
budget constraint in (1). We convert this constraint into a more conve-
nient form as follows. Since mt+1 = ￿mt, we are able to write
Mt￿Mt￿1
Pt =
(￿ ￿ ￿)mt￿1. We also recall (4) again, together with our other previous ob-
servations that yt = akt and gt = ￿akt. Using (11), it then follows that (1)






+ ￿￿a = ￿a +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿a
￿
: (12)
The ￿rst term on the left-hand-side of this expression is the government￿ s
revenue from seigniorage. It comprises the in￿ ation tax rate, ￿ ￿ ￿, and
10That output grows at the rate ￿ as well is con￿rmed by setting lt = ￿ and gt = ￿yt in
(3) to obtain yt = akt.




kt ). Ceteris paribus,
an increase in in￿ ation increases this revenue both directly (by raising the
revenue from any given level of tax base) and indirectly (by increasing the
level of tax base, itself). Of course, a full account of in￿ ationary ￿nance needs
to acknowledge the opposite e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿. These variables are understood
as being determined jointly from the simultaneous system described by (10)
and (12). Thus we combine these relationships to arrive at the following ￿nal










(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿a
￿
￿ ￿￿a: (13)
We are now in a position to study the e⁄ect of corruption on in￿ ationary
￿nance. Consider, ￿rst, the right-hand-side of (13) which shows the primary
de￿cit of the government. Evidently, this is decreasing in ￿, the fraction of
bureaucrats who are non-corrupt. When no bureaucrat is corrupt (￿ = 1),
the government obtains the maximum tax revenue collected by bureaucrats
from ￿rms. When some bureaucrats are corrupt (￿ < 1), part of this rev-
enue goes missing and the more of it does so the greater is the number of
these individuals. Now consider the left-hand-side of (13) which shows the
government￿ s revenue from seigniorage. Using the expression for ￿(￿), it is
straightforward to show that this is a decreasing function of ￿. Thus the
observation made above continues to be true - namely, that an increase in
seigniorage revenues is associated with an increase in in￿ ation. Collecting
these results together, we arrive at the conclusion that ￿ and ￿ are posi-
tively related: in￿ ation in a corrupt environment is greater than in￿ ation in
a non-corrupt environment.
Having established the above, it is a short step to realise the e⁄ect of
corruption on growth. As we have seen in (10), growth is negatively related
to in￿ ation because of intermediaries￿optimal portfolio allocation decisions:
higher in￿ ation induces lower capital investment as intermediaries seek to en-
hance their currency reserves. Since higher in￿ ation is caused by corruption,
then corruption is the source of lower growth.
3 Evidence
Our theoretical analysis yields predictions which, in principle, may be tested
empirically. We seek to do this in the remainder of the paper. Our primary
objective is to evaluate the extent to which corruption has an indirect adverse
e⁄ect on growth through its distortion of government revenues in favour of
seigniorage.
113.1 Estimation Strategy and Methodology
Our empirical strategy is to predict growth using a consistent treatment of the
government budget constraint, together with commonly-employed indicators
of corruption. We concern ourselves not with the entire budget constraint,
but rather with only its revenue components since it is these for which our
theoretical analysis makes predictions, the general conjecture being that cor-
ruption alters the relative importance of alternative sources of ￿nance. More
speci￿cally, our focus is on a coe⁄cient of interaction term between corrup-
tion and seigniorage which we incorporate into our growth regressions, taking
proper account of the revenue side of the public sector accounts.
We begin by computing the budget shares of the di⁄erent components
of public ￿nance - that is, the value of each component as a proportion of
total revenues plus the budget de￿cit. In doing so, we take account of two
considerations. First, as pointed out by others, since these ￿nancing variables
are bound together in an indentity, one of them needs to be removed in
order to avoid perfect multi-collinearity among the ￿scal regressors in the
estimated growth equation (e.g., Adam and Bevan 2005; Bose et al. 2007;
Kneller et al. 1999). The coe¢ cients on the remaining ￿nancing variables
are then understood as measuring their e⁄ect on growth net of the e⁄ect of
the excluded variable. Second, it is also necessary to control for the level
e⁄ects of total revenue and the budget de￿cit on growth, independently of
their composition e⁄ects. As elsewhere, we do this by taking the ratio of
these variables to GDP (e.g., Devarajan et al. 1996).11
Given the above, our benchmark growth regression model is









+￿Cit + ￿CitSit + ￿i + ￿t + "it; (14)
where the notation is as follows: i is the country index; git denotes the growth
rate of per capita real GDP; fXl;itgm
l=1 represents a set of non-￿scal condition-
ing variables that typically appear in growth regressions; fZj;itgn
j=1 represents
the set of budget revenue variables, measured as fractions of total revenue
plus grants, TRit, plus the budget de￿cit, BDit; Cit denotes an index of cor-
ruption; CitSit is the interaction term between corruption and seigniorage;
￿i and ￿t capture time-invariant country-speci￿c e⁄ects and time-varying
common e⁄ects, respectively; and "it is the error term.
The set fXl;itgm
l=1 includes a baseline group of controls comprising the
log of initial real GDP per capita, the ratio of investment to GDP and the
11As shown later, including these variables separately does not alter our results.
12rate of population growth. Added to these, the extended group of controls
includes the log of initial primary school enrollment rates, the ratio of trade
to GDP, the rate of in￿ ation and a dummy variable for countries located in
the tropical climate zone.12 The set fZjgn
j=1 is de￿ned initially to include
seigniorage and debt, with other revenue components excluded for reasons
given above.13 If these other sources of ￿nance are labelled collectively by Z0,
then given the budget identity
Pn
j=0 Zj = 1, the coe¢ cient ￿j = (￿j ￿ ￿o) is
understood to measure the marginal impact on growth of the included ￿scal
factor Zj, net of the marginal impact of the excluded factor Z0. The variables
TRit and BDit are used to control for any level e⁄ect of revenue on growth, as
alluded to earlier. The term CitSit is the key element in our regression, being
used to capture the idea that a higher incidence of corruption, by inducing a
greater reliance on seigniorage, has an adverse e⁄ect on growth. We therefore
interpret a negative value of ￿ as evidence of corruption impeding growth
through its in￿ uence on the composition of public ￿nances. The terms ￿i
and ￿t are incorporated in our benchmark panel speci￿cation as a means
of allowing both ￿xed-country and time-speci￿c e⁄ects to capture certain
observed patterns in growth - in particular, the uneveness of growth across
countries and the general slowdown of growth since the early 1980s.14
The panel estimations we use are based on techniques that address the
potential endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables (in particular, the pos-
sibility that the ￿scal and corruption variables may be in￿ uenced by growth).
The ￿rst method is a standard two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS),
where the instruments are either the initial or lagged values of the vari-
ables.15 The idea is that these values may plausibly be taken as exogenous
to the subsequent ￿ve years of growth (the period of our averaging). The
second method is the system-GMM estimation developed by Blundell and
Bond (1998). This technique accounts for possible endogeneity by employ-
ing a rich set of endogenous instruments, treating the model as a system of
equations in ￿rst-di⁄erences and in levels. The endogenous variables in the
￿rst-di⁄erence equations are instrumented with lags of their levels, whilst
12The inclusion of in￿ ation as an explanatory variable in the growth regression is meant
to capture any potential independent e⁄ect of in￿ ation on growth beyond its possible e⁄ect
through seigniorage.
13In our subsequent robustness analysis, we examine the implications of excluding each
of the former variables, as well as using a more disaggregated measure of other revenues.
14In our instrumental variable regressions, we also include dummies that capture
continent-speci￿c e⁄ects. Although not reported, it turns out that, in general, all sets
of dummies are strongly signi￿cant and pick up much of the growth di⁄erences across
countries, regions, and time periods.
15Countries missing the very ￿rst observation of the respective period averaging are
instrumented by their second observation, or are dropped if no early enough data exist.
13the endogenous variables in the level equations are instrumented with lags
of their ￿rst di⁄erences. A di¢ culty associated with system-GMM relates to
the choice of the number of lags of the endogenous and predetermined vari-
ables. To enhance the robustness of our results, we estimate our model with
di⁄erent sets of lags. We initially use an unrestricted number of lags, starting
at a lag length of two, and thereafter reduce the length of the maximum lags
to four and then three. This allows us to restrict the number of instruments
to be less than the number of countries in the regression.16
In the system-GMM approach we check the validity of the instruments
by applying two speci￿cation tests. The ￿rst is the Hansen (1982) J-test of
over-identifying restrictions which we use to examine the exogeneity of the
instruments. This test is consistent in the presence of both heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation of any pattern.17 The second is the Arellano and
Bond (1991) test for serial correlation, the existence of which can cause a
bias to both the estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors. We apply this
test to all of our instrumental variable regressions, checking for serial cor-
relation of both ￿rst and second order. When the former is detected, we
make the standard errors robust to serial correlation by clustering them by
country. Additionally, in order to avoid dynamic panel bias, we instrument
for regressors that are not strictly exogenous. These include investment in
the baseline control set, and trade and in￿ ation in the extended set. Finally,
we note that, since the system-GMM strategy of ￿rst-di⁄erencing induces
￿rst-order serial correlation in the transformed errors, the appropriate check
in this case relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation.
3.2 Data
We use a panel of 82 countries (a list of which is given in the Appendix)
for the period 1980-1999. The choice of period is restricted by data avail-
ability for corruption, credible measures of which did not exist prior to the
early 1980s. We follow the standard approach of constructing 5-year pe-
riod averages (1980-84 to 1995-99) so as to minimise business cycle e⁄ects.
This implies a maximum sample size of 328 observations, though we end up
working with an unbalanced panel of 254 observations because of missing
data.
16As pointed out by Roodman (2004), an excessive number of instruments can result in
an over￿tting of the instrumented variables, thereby biasing the results towards those of
the OLS.
17Failure of the null hypothesis suggests that the set of instruments is incomplete im-
plying omitted variables bias.
14Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the data, as well as provid-
ing de￿nitions and sources. A few further comments about particular vari-
ables are as follows. Following Fischer (1982) and Cukierman et al. (1992),
seigniorage is de￿ned to be the change in reserve money as a fraction of total
revenue, grants and the budget de￿cit. Debt-￿nancing is measured along
the lines of Adam and Bevan (2005) and Bose et al. (2007) as the resid-
ual between the budget de￿cit and seigniorage. Our benchmark measure of
corruption is given by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index
which we supplement later with three others - the Transparancy Interna-
tional (TI) index, the Dreher et al. (2007) (DKM) index and the Kaufmann
et al. (2006) (KKM) index. Where appropriate, we re-scale the indices to
make them comparable in the sense that a higher score on each of them
corresponds to a higher level of corruption.
A ￿rst indication that our theoretical results may have empirical support
is given in Figure 1 which displays cross-country scatterplots of the level of
seigniorage against the four alternative corruption indices. Whilst the latter
involve di⁄erent period averages, all of the scatterplots show a broad positive
relationship between seigniorage and corruption, with the correlation coe¢ -
cient ranging between 0.35-0.41. Given this, we are encouraged to pursue a
more formal analysis of the joint importance of these variables in determining
growth.
3.3 Baseline Results
We begin our investigations by estimating equation (14) with ￿xed-e⁄ects,
2SLS and system-GMM using the set(s) of control variables described above.
Our ￿ndings are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports the results of the
regressions with the baseline set of controls, while Panel B reports the re-
sults with the extended set. Before discussing these results in detail, we
note that our main theoretical conjecture is strongly supported in each case.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term Seigniorage￿ICRG is negative and
statistically signi￿cant in all regressions. Thus, seigniorage appears to have
a stronger adverse growth e⁄ect in countries that are characterised by high
levels of corruption.
The ￿xed-e⁄ects results in column (1) illustrate the typical ￿ndings of
growth regressions concerning the set of non-￿scal controls: there is condi-
tional income convergence, a positive in￿ uence of investment and a negative
in￿ uence of population growth. As regards the e⁄ects of the ￿scal variables,
recall that we omit the category of total revenue and grants as a way of
avoiding collinearity problems. This means that the estimated coe¢ cient
on each included source of ￿nance is a measure of the marginal impact on
15growth of raising revenue from that source in order to o⁄set a reduction in
the excluded component.18 According to our results, the marginal impact of
raising debt is signi￿cantly negative, whilst the marginal impact of raising
seigniorage is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The implication is that the
compositional trade-o⁄ between debt and total revenue is growth-inhibiting,
whilst the compositional trade-o⁄ between seigniorage and total revenue is
growth-neutral. As observed in other growth studies, we ￿nd that the level
e⁄ect of total revenue (including grants) plus the budget de￿cit is negative
(e.g., Bose et al. 2007; Kneller et al. 1999).19 Since we do not control for any
category of public expenditure, this level e⁄ect can be interpreted to mean
that an increase in the ￿nancing of total expenditures has an adverse e⁄ect
on growth. It is worth noting that our results remain unchanged when we
do control for di⁄erent types of expenditure and allow ourselves to capture
the separate e⁄ects of these (for example, the e⁄ects of productive versus
residual expenditures).20 Turning to corruption, we ￿nd that this has no
statistically signi￿cant direct e⁄ect on growth. This is not an usual result:
as ￿rst pointed out by Mauro (1995), corruption a⁄ects growth only indi-
rectly through its e⁄ect on other factors, such as investment. The fact that
we already include investment in our regression means that we control for
this channel of in￿ uence. Similar observations are made by Pellegrini and
Gerlagh (2004), whilst other authors have identi￿ed the context-speci￿c na-
ture of the e⁄ects of corruption.21 By contrast, the interaction term between
corruption and seigniorage is seen to have a strongly signi￿cant negative im-
pact on growth. This accords well with our main conjecture that corruption
a⁄ects growth indirectly by tilting the composition of public ￿nances towards
greater seigniorage.
The 2SLS results in columns (2) and (3) provide further support for our
18As indicated earlier, our analysis of robustness reveals that the choice of which com-
ponent to exclude is inconsequential for our results, having little bearing on the model￿ s
statistical properties. In addition, the coe¢ cients on all components are fully recoverable
by substitution between the di⁄erent versions of the model.
19Once again, we draw attention to the distinction between the compositional and level
e⁄ects on growth of the di⁄erent categories of ￿nance and the budget de￿cit. For further
evidence of the latter, see Adam and Bevan (2005), Bose et al. (2007) and Miller and
Russek (1997).
20Following Adam and Bevan (2005), we de￿ne productive expenditure as expenditure
on health, education, infrastructure, public order, safety, and public administration, whilst
residual expenditure refers to spending on economic services, recreation and culture, and
other miscellaneous items. This classi￿cation also accords with Kneller et al. (1999).
21For example, MØndez and Sepœlveda (2006) conclude that the negative e⁄ect of cor-
ruption on growth is con￿ned mainly to ￿free￿countries, whilst Aidt et al. (2007) ￿nd
that the e⁄ect is strong only in countries with a high quality of political institutions.
16main hypothesis. The potentially endogenous regressors that we instrument
for (indicated by bold type) are investment, corruption and the ￿scal vari-
ables in Panel A, augmented by trade and in￿ ation in Panel B. Column (2)
corresponds to the case in which we instrument with inital values, whilst
column (3) represents the case in which we instrument with once-lagged val-
ues. Controlling for endogeneity improves the ￿t of the regression without
dramatically altering any of the results (aside from debt-￿nancing becoming
insigni￿cant). In all cases the coe¢ cient on the corruption-seigniorage in-
teraction term remains similar in magnitude and signi￿cance to what it was
before. In all cases, as well, the Arellano and Bond (1991) speci￿cation test
reveals the absence of both ￿rst- and second-order serial correlation in the
error term (i.e., the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of neither type of
serial correlation at the 5 percent level).
The system-GMM results in columns (4), (5) and (6) provide ￿nal evi-
dence in favour of our model. The regression employed in column (4) involves
all possible lags of the endogenous variables as instruments, starting from
the second lag, whilst the regressions used in columns (5) and (6) restrict
the maximum number of lags to 4 and 3, respectively (so that the number of
instruments diminish as one moves from left to right across the Table). The
coe¢ cient on the interaction term, whilst somewhat lower (in absolute value)
than in the previous regressions, continues to be negative and signi￿cant ir-
respective of the number of instruments used. In addition, the validity of
the instruments are con￿rmed by both the Hansen (1982) and Arellano and
Bond (1991) speci￿cation tests (the former being unable to reject the null
of instrument exogeneity at the 5 percent level, and the latter being unable
to reject the null of no second-order serial correlation, also at the 5 percent
level).
The ￿nal point to note from our baseline ￿ndings is that the coe¢ cient on
the interaction term is fairly stable across the di⁄erent regressions (especially
in panel A) and that its value implies a large quantitative e⁄ect of corruption
on growth. To appreciate the size of this e⁄ect, consider a country that lies at
the 75th percentile of our data on corruption and seigniorage. This country
is predicted to grow by 1.57 percentage points slower than a country at the
50th percentile, and by 2.15 percentage points slower than a country at the
25th percentile. These orders of magnitude are clearly non-trivial.22
22The calculations are based on the average of the interaction terms (￿0:707) in Panel
A. The 75th, 50th and 25th percentiles for the corruption index are 3.31, 2.67 and 1,
respectively. The corresponding values for seigniorage are 0.095, 0.035 and 0.013.
173.4 Robustness
We examine the sensitivity of our baseline results by re-running the regres-
sions under various modi￿cations. These include the exclusion of alternative
￿scal components, the removal of one country at a time from the sample, the
use of alternative measures of corruption and seigniorage, and the modelling
of non-linearities and convergence e⁄ects. As we shall see, our basic ￿ndings
survive all of these robustness checks.
3.4.1 Exclusion of Alternative Revenue Categories
Our estimations have so far been based on the exclusion of total revenue and
grants from the list of ￿scal regressors. We now alter our choice of which
￿nancing category to leave out, the results from doing which are summarised
in Table 3. Column (1) represents the case in which debt ￿nancing is ex-
cluded, whilst column (2) corresponds to the case in which seigniorage is
omitted. As before, the estimated coe¢ cient on each remaining ￿scal vari-
able gives the marginal impact on growth of increasing that variable in order
to compensate for a reduction in the excluded component. For example, a
compensated reduction of debt by an increase in either seigniorage or total
revenue and grants is found to be growth-neutral at the 5 percent level. In
terms of our main concern, the results provide con￿rmation of our previous
￿ndings. Indeed, the general conclusion to draw from this exercise is that the
choice of which ￿nancing component to exclude has no bearing on the statis-
tical properties of the model, nor on the coe¢ cient estimates of the non-￿scal
variables (including, importantly, the multiplicative interaction term).
As a further robustness check, we perform a similar exercise for the ￿xed
e⁄ects and 2SLS regressions by disaggregating the category of total revenue
and grants into three components - tax revenue, non-tax revenue and grant
income. Thus we expand the total number of ￿nancing components from 3 to
5. Choosing grants as the excluded category (which has the fewest number of
observations), we obtain similar results to those above. These are presented
in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 3, where we focus on the interaction
term to keep to the bare essentials. Again, we ￿nd that this term remains
negative, signi￿cant and stable across all regressions.
3.4.2 Testing for Outliers
To check that our ￿ndings are not driven by outliers, we ￿rst re-run the bench-
mark regressions of columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2, dropping one country
at a time. Table 4 reports the new coe¢ cient estimates of the seigniorage-
corruption interaction term, together with the t-statistics and p-values for
18the minimum and maximum values of this estimate. The results indicate sig-
ni￿cant robustness to all speci￿cations, delivering minimum t-statistics that
are well above conventional signi￿cance levels. Given this, we conclude that
our ￿ndings are not driven by outliers.
We next check again the speci￿cation of our model, focusing speci￿cally
on the joint variable of total revenue, grants and the budget de￿cit that we
have been using to control for level e⁄ects. We examine whether the use of
this variable has been biasing the results by splitting the variable into its two
components. Our ￿ndings, reported in column (1) of Table 5, suggest that
only the level e⁄ect of total revenue and grants is signi￿cant. Other than
this, our previous results are unchanged.
Finally, we run a regression based on observations for which the absolute
value of seigniorage does not exceed the absolute value of the budget de￿cit.
The idea behind this is to consider only those countries in which seigniorage is
used to part-￿nance budget de￿cits, excluding others where money is printed
excessively in the sense of not being justi￿ed by budget requirements, but
rather being due to other reasons. The results, shown in column (2) of Table
5, remain the same as before.
3.4.3 Alternative Measures of Corruption and Seigniorage
In all of the preceding analysis we have adopted the ICRG index as our
measure of corruption. This is not the only measure, however, and it is im-
portant to verify that our results can be established with the use of others.
As mentioned earlier, we consider three alternatives which di⁄er in terms of
their coverage and construction. These are the Transparency International
(TI) index, the Kaufmann et al. (2006) (KKM) index, and the Dreher et al.
(2007) (DKM) index. Our initial preference for the ICRG index is due to
its uninterupted annual coverage over a relatively long period (1984-1999),
allowing us to use both initial and lagged values as instruments in our 5-year
period averaging. By contrast, the TI and KKM indices give annual observa-
tions only after 1995 and 1996, respectively, making it impractical to apply
the same instrumentation techniques.23 The most ideally suited alternative
is the DKM index which extends the furthest backwards, reporting period
averages from 1976-80 to 1991-97. In spite of their di⁄erences, however, all
of these indices display high correlations - 0.90 (TI), 0.86 (KKM) and 0.74
(DKM) - with the ICRG index. This suggests that the choice of corruption
measure ought not to have a substantial impact on our results, a presumption
that is con￿rmed when we re-run the regressions under each alternative. We
23Whilst the TI index extends back to 1980, the ￿rst two observations are period averages
for 1980-85 and 1988-92.
19illustrate this in Table 5, column (3) of which is based on the ￿xed-e⁄ects re-
gression using the TI index (implying a reduction in sample size by as much
as one-third), whilst columns (4) and (5) involve the same regression but
using the DKM index.
In similar vein, we also check the sensitivity of our results to alternative
measures of seigniorage. These are the measures proposed by Walsh (1998),
Honohan (1996) and de Haan et al. (1993) which we label, respectively, as

























where mt denotes reserve money ( _ mt being its rate of growth), ￿t is the rate
of in￿ ation, and TRt and BDt are as de￿ned earlier. The results obtained
from re-running our 2SLS (with initial values as instruments) and system-
GMM regressions are recorded in Table 6. In all cases our previous ￿ndings
are con￿rmed, with the corruption-seigniorage interaction term remaining
negative, signi￿cant and of the same order of magnitude.
3.4.4 Non-linear, Convergence, and Other Interaction E⁄ects of
Corruption and Seigniorage
It has been suggested by some authors that the e⁄ect of corruption on growth
exhibits diminishing returns (e.g., MØndez and Sepœlveda 2006) and that the
growth e⁄ects of ￿scal variables (including seigniorage) are also non-linear
(e.g., Adam and Bevan 2005). One potential explanation for our negative
interaction term could be that it is the result of a similar non-linearity which
is not accounted for in our estimation procedure. For example, it is possible
that this term is proxying for the squared levels of corruption and seigniorage,
rather being an important explanatory variable in its own right. To check
this, we modify our regression speci￿cation to allow for these squared e⁄ects,
thereby enabling us to test whether the interaction term has an independent
impact on growth in the presence of non-linearities. The results from doing
this are given in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, where it is seen that the in-
teraction term remains negative and signi￿cant, whilst neither of the squared
20terms are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Given this, we conclude that our
￿ndings are not driven by non-linear corruption and seigniorage e⁄ects.24
A related issue concerns the possibility of convergence e⁄ects induced by
corruption and seigniorage. Recent empirical studies have shown that both
corruption and seigniorage play a potentially important role in the conver-
gence of income across countries (e.g., Bose et al. 2007; Keefer and Knack
1997). If either of these variables are strongly correlated with initial income,
then our estimated interaction term could be picking up such a role. To avoid
this, we re-run our regressions with seigniorage and corruption alternately in-
teracting with log of initial income. Our results, reported in columns (3) and
(4) of Table 7, show that the seigniorage-corruption interaction term contin-
ues to be negative and signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. In addition, there
is evidence of both a direct e⁄ect of corruption on growth and an indirect
e⁄ect through income convergence (implying that corruption is particularly
harmful in more developed countries). The growth e⁄ects of seigniorage, by
contrast, do not appear to be widely di⁄erent across di⁄erent income levels.
A ￿nal set of checks that we undertake is motivated by the observation
that the negative e⁄ect of corruption on growth is not always as strong as
is often claimed, but rather appears to be context-speci￿c. For example,
there is evidence to suggest that the e⁄ect is most pronounced in countries
with large government sectors (e.g., Mauro 1998), in countries located in
Africa and Latin America (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho 2007) and
in countries with poorly-developed ￿nancial systems (e.g., Ahlin and Pang
2007). We therefore test the validity of our results when such considera-
tions are taken into account. Our ￿ndings are summarised again in Table
7. Column (5) shows what happens when we re-run our baseline regression
with the inclusion of an interaction term between corruption and ￿nancial
development. Following Ahlin and Pang (2007), we measure the latter vari-
able by the total amount of credit issued to private enterprises by deposit
money banks and other ￿nancial institutions, normalised by GDP. We ob-
tain similar results to those authors, with the new interaction term being
positive and signi￿cant (albeit at the 10 percent level). This indicates a sub-
stitutability between the variables that make up this term: when corruption
is high (￿nancial development is low), the marginal impact from improving
￿nancial development (reducing corruption) is greater. As regards the in-
teraction term between corruption and seigniorage, the estimated coe¢ cient
on this remains negative and signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. Column (6)
24Although we report regressions where each squared term is added in turn, the inclusion
of both squared terms simultaneously does not alter our results. Similarly, our ￿ndings
remain intact if we amend the regression further to include Inflation￿ICRG and its
squared term to control for other non-linearities.
21reveals the e⁄ects of incorporating government consumption expenditure, to-
gether with its interaction with corruption, in our baseline speci￿cation. We
observe, again, that the corruption-seigniorage interaction term continues to
be negative and signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. By contrast, the additional
interaction term is insigni￿cant, a ￿nding which is also obtained by MØndez
and Sepœlveda (2006) and which counters the argument of Mauro (1998) that
corruption is more detrimental when governments are larger. Finally, column
(7) shows the implications of modifying our regression to include interaction
terms between corruption and regional dummies. We ￿nd that the interac-
tion involving Latin American countries is negative and signi￿cant, whilst
the interaction involving African countries is insigni￿cant. The ￿rst result
is consistent with the conclusion of Gyimah-Brempong and Camacho (2007)
that corruption is especially harmful to growth in Latin American economies,
but the second result runs counter to the same authors￿similar conclusion
regarding African economies. Once again, the sign and signi￿cance of our
corruption-seigniorage interaction term remain unchallenged.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our aim in this paper has been to study how bureaucratic corruption may
impact on economic growth through its e⁄ect on public ￿nances. The basic
idea is that corruption alters the composition of government revenues, caus-
ing an increase in in￿ ationary ￿nance and, with this, a reduction in capital
accumulation. This idea is formalised within a simple theoretical model and
supported by strong empirical evidence.
The theoretical model describes an endogenously growing economy in
which ￿nancial intermediaries make portfolio decisions on behalf of agents
and bureaucrats collect tax revenues on behalf of the government. Inter-
mediaries choose how much of their deposits to invest in capital and how
much to hold as money, where the latter is motivated by the existence of
idiosyncratic relocation shocks. Bureaucrats seek to enrich themselves by
embezzling tax revenues, the e⁄ect of which is to increase the government￿ s
reliance on seigniorage as a means of ￿nancing its expenditures. A higher
level of seigniorage implies a higher rate of in￿ ation which induces a portfolio
reallocation away from capital towards money. Growth is reduced as a result.
The supporting empirical evidence is obtained by applying standard re-
gression techniques to trace the impact of corruption on growth when the
share of seigniorage in total government revenue is a conditioning variable.
Taking proper account of the government￿ s budget constraint, our economet-
ric analysis con￿rms the basic predictions of our model. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd
22strong evidence of a negative interaction between corruption and seigniorage,
as is consistent with the idea that corruption tends to aggravate the harm-
ful e⁄ects of in￿ ationary ￿nance. Our results are robust to a wide range of
sensitivity tests and e⁄orts to control for simultaneity bias.
In summary, this paper highlights a potentially important channel through
which corruption may adversely a⁄ect growth. This channel operates indi-
rectly via the impact of corruption on the composition of public ￿nances.
23Appendix: Sample Countries
Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo Dem.
Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark,
Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon,
Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea Rep.,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mongolia, Namibia,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Rep., South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and To-
bago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen
Rep., Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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Seigniorage = 0.066+ 0.109*DKM 
                      (0.000)  (0.000) 
N = 72, R
2 = 0.123 
351  ρ = 0.
Seigniorage = 0.078+ 0.027*KKM 
                      (0.000)  (0.00) 
N = 80, R
2 = 0.170 
ρ = 0.412 
Note: Seigniorage – change in high-powered (reserve) money as a fraction of total revenue, grants, and budget deficit (average of 1970-2000); ICRG – 
corruption, International Country Risk Guide measure (average of 1984-2000); TI – corruption, Transparency International measure (average of 1980-2000); 
KKM – corruption, Kaufmann et al. (2006) measure (average of 1996-2000) ; DKM – corruption, Dreher et al. (2007) measure (average of 1976-1997). Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std  Deviation  Min  Max  Obs 
Country characteristics         
GDP p.c. growth (%)  1.1%  2.9%  -11.7%  10.7%  315 
Log initial p.c. GDP (2000 US dollars)  24.0  2.0  19.1  29.7  315 
Investment (% GDP)  22.4%  6.3%  6.2%  47.5%  315 
Population growth (%)  1.5%  1.7%  -20.3%  4.9%  328 
          
Fiscal variables (% GDP)          
Total revenues and grants  28.4%  11.3%  6.6%  76.5%  280 
Budget deficit  3.6%  5.7%  -26.4%  41.9%  278 
Total revenue, grants, and budget deficit  32.0%  12.4%  8.5%  90.9%  278 
Fiscal variables (%Total revenue, grants, 
and budget deficit)    
   
Tax revenue  69.7%  17.6%  2.9%  100.8%  278 
Non-tax revenue  16.3%  17.0%  1.5%  146.3%  278 
Grants 3.5%  5.8%  0.003%  34.4%  223 
Total revenue and grants   89.2%  14.1%  39.3%  161.3%  278 
Seigniorage   0.3%  0.8%  -0.07%  8.8%  274 
Debt financing   10.5%  14.0%  -61.3%  60.2%  274 
         
Corruption variables         
ICRG  2.4 1.4  0  6 299 
TI  2.6 1.4 0.2  5.9  178 
DKM 0.01  0.2  -0.9  0.3  195 
Sources: Data on per capita growth, GDP per capita, investment, population growth, primary school enrollment, trade, and inflation are 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, online). 
Data on fiscal variables are from the Government Finance Statistics (IMF, online), apart from data on reserve money used to calculate 
seigniorage, which are from the International Financial Statistics (IMF, online). 
Definitions (GFS codes reported in brackets): 
Tax revenue = direct taxes (taxes on income, profits, and capital gains [81a] + social security contributions [81b] + taxes on payroll 
[81c] + taxes on property [81d]) + indirect taxes (domestic taxes on goods and services [81e]) + taxes on international trade and 
transactions [81f]. 
Non-tax revenue = other taxes [81g] + non-tax revenue [81yb] + capital revenue [81yc]. 
Grants = grants [81z]. 
Total revenue and grants = tax revenue + non-tax revenue + grants. 
Overall budget deficit = total expenditure + net lending – total revenue and grants. 
Seigniorage = change in reserve money as a fraction of total revenue, grants and budget deficit. 
All fiscal data cover central government fiscal accounts only. 
ICRG – corruption, International Country Risk Guide index 
TI – corruption, Transparency International index 
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Panel A: regressions with baseline controls 




























































Total revenue, grants, and 





































Countries / Obs  82 / 254  81 / 243  72 / 171  82 / 254  82 / 254  82 / 254 
Number  of  Instruments      67 61 52 
R-square  0.46  0.50  0.61     
Hansen  J-test  (p-value)       0.55 0.49 0.42 
AR(1)  test  (p-value)   0.54  0.32 0.002 0.003 0.003 
AR(2)  test  p-value    0.43  0.21  0.97 0.97 0.91 
           
Panel B: regressions with extended controls 




























































Total revenue, grants, and 





































Countries / Obs  76 / 232  74 / 221  65 / 156  76 / 232  76 / 232  76 / 232 
Number of Instruments        101  89  74 
R-square  0.55  0.52  0.54     
Hansen  J-test  (p-value)       0.99 0.95 0.64 
AR(1)  test  (p-value)   0.38  0.67 0.002 0.004 0.004 
AR(2)  test  p-value    0.35  0.20  0.78 0.77 0.75 
Endogenous variables used 




two time lags 
Two to four 
time lags 
Two and three 
time lags 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term, time dummies, and regional 
dummies controlling for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, and East Europe 
and Central Asia not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Additional regressors included in panel B regressions 
are log initial primary school enrollment, trade, inflation, and tropics. Table 3 
Robustness to excluding alternative fiscal categories and to disaggregating total revenue and grants into 











Panel A: regressions with baseline controls 








Seigniorage  -0.809 
(0.08) 










    












Total revenue, grants, and 































Countries / Obs  81 / 243  81 / 243  82 / 254  81 / 242  72 / 171 
R-square 0.50  0.50  0.47  0.51  0.62 
AR(1) test (p-value)  0.54  0.54    0.57  0.36 
AR(2) test p-value  0.43  0.43    0.28  0.19 
          
Panel B: regressions with extended controls 








Seigniorage  -0.377 
(0.38) 










    












Total revenue, grants, and 































Countries / Obs  74 / 221  74 / 221  75 / 230  74 / 220  65 / 157 
R-square 0.52  0.52  0.59  0.53  0.63 
AR(1) test (p-value)  0.38  0.38    0.22  0.30 
AR(2) test p-value  0.35  0.35    0.38  0.18 
Endogenous variables used 
as instruments  Initial values  Initial values  -  Initial values  Once lagged 
values 
Regression (1) involves the specification of Table 2 but instead excludes debt financing. 
Regression (2) involves the specification of Table 2 but instead excludes seigniorage. 
Regressions (3) to (5) involve the disaggregation of total revenue and grants, and exclude grants. 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term, time dummies, and 
regional dummies controlling for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, South 
Asia, and East Europe and Central Asia not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Regressors included 
in Panel A are log initial GDP per capita, investment, and population growth. Additional regressors included in 
panel B regressions are log initial primary school enrollment, trade, inflation, and tropics.  Table 4 
Robustness to excluding from the sample one country at a time 







Panel A: regressions with baseline controls 




































      
Panel B: regressions with extended controls 




































Endogenous variables used 
as instruments  - Initial  values  Once lagged 
values 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and p-values (in parentheses based on 
robust and clustered standard errors) for the seigniorage and corruption 
interaction term. Panels A and B follow the specifications of panels A and B 
of Table 2. The coefficients of Table 2 are reproduced here, along with the 
minimum and maximum coefficients of the interaction term and their t-
statistics (in brackets) that result from dropping one country at a time from the 




Robustness to size of seigniorage and alternative measures of corruption (excluded fiscal category: total 



































      
Budget deficit (% GDP)  0.012 
(0.88) 
      
Total revenue, grants, and 





























Countries / Obs  81 / 243  81 / 240  53 / 159  71 / 175  62 / 149 
R-square  0.50 0.51  0.58  0.46 0.57 
AR(1) test (p-value)  0.46  0.58      0.33 
AR(2) test p-value  0.41  0.62      0.31 
Endogenous variables used 
as instruments  Initial values  Initial values  -  -  Once lagged 
values 
Regression (1) involves splitting the joint variable of total revenue, grants and budget deficit (% GDP), as control 
of the level effect, into its two counterparts. 
Regression (2) involves observations for which the absolute value of seigniorage is less than the absolute value of 
the budget deficit. Corruption measured by ICRG. 
Regression (3) involves corruption measured by TI. 
Regressions (4) and (5) involve corruption measured by DKM. 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term, time dummies, and 
regional dummies controlling for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, South 
Asia, and East Europe and Central Asia not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Additional 
regressors included are log initial GDP per capita, investment, and population growth. 
 
 Table 6 





































Total revenue, grants, 






































Countries / Obs  81 / 242  82 / 254  81 / 243  82 / 254  78 / 237  80 / 248 
Number of Instruments    67    67    67 
R-square 0.47    0.50    0.53   
Hansen  J-test  (p-value)   0.31  0.55   0.68 
AR(1) test (p-value)  0.15  0.006  0.48  0.003  0.51  0.004 
AR(2)  test  p-value 0.84 0.62 0.44 0.95 0.06  0.83 
Endogenous variables 
used as instruments  Initial values 
Unrestricted 









two time lags 
Regressions (1) and (2) involve seigniorage measured by Seigniorage2. 
Regressions (3) and (4) involve seigniorage measured by Seigniorage3. 
Regressions (5) and (6) involve seigniorage measured by Seigniorage4. 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term, time dummies, and regional dummies 
controlling for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, and East Europe and Central Asia 
not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Additional regressors included are log initial GDP per capita, investment, and 
population growth. 
 
 Table 7 
Robustness to nonlinear, convergence, and other proposed interaction effects (excluded fiscal category: total revenue and grants) 

















































Total revenue, grants, 















































        
Seigniorage
2  -0.033 
(0.18) 
      
ICRG * Log initial pc 
GDP 
   -0.042 
(0.003) 
    
Seigniorage * Log 
initial pc GDP 
     -0.910 
(0.17) 
   
Financial development        -0.853 
(0.16) 
  
ICRG * Financial 
development 





        -0.005 
(0.92) 
 
ICRG * Government 
expenditures 
        -0.003 
(0.20) 
 
ICRG * SSA            -0.288 
(0.29) 
ICRG * EAP            0.193 
(0.61) 
ICRG * LAC            -0.610 
(0.05) 
ICRG * SA            -0.036 
(0.95) 
ICRG * ECA            0.180 
(0.82) 
Countries / Obs  78 / 236  81 / 243  81 / 243  81 / 243  76 / 205  81 / 240  81 / 243 
R-square  0.50  0.49  0.51  0.46 0.56 0.51 0.52 
AR(1)  test  (p-value)  0.62  0.59  0.54  0.96 0.15 0.48 0.53 
AR(2)  test  p-value 0.45  0.45  0.26  0.56 0.29 0.52 0.22 
Endogenous variables 
used as instruments  Initial values  Initial values  Initial values  Initial values  Initial values  Initial values  Initial values 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term, time dummies, and regional dummies 
controlling for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), East Asia and Pacific (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA), and 
East Europe and Central Asia (ECA) not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Additional regressors included are log initial 
GDP per capita, investment, and population growth. 
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